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CORPORATE PURCHASE OF ITS OWN SHARES-
ARE THERE NEW OVERTONES?
Carlos L. Israelst
The leading case of Trevor v. Whitworthl1 established as the law of
England the rule that a corporation could not properly go into the
market and purchase its own shares. If it bought them for resale it
would be "trafficking in shares" rather than engaging in the business
for which it was chartered. If it bought them for retirement it would
be unlawfully reducing capital without the court approval required by
the Companies Act.
Trevor was not long followed in the United States. American statutes
and decisions today generally sanction a corporate purchase of its own
shares if made "out of surplus" or "out of earned surplus," or forbid it
only if capital is impaired or the purchase will impair capital. Where
shares are by their terms redeemable (as are most preferred issues) their
purchase is generally permitted not only out of surplus but out of capital
as well, unless at the time of purchase the corporation is insolvent (i.e.,
unable to meet its debts as they mature in the ordinary course of busi-
ness), or the purchase will render it insolvent.2
Granting the existence of clear corporate power to make the purchase,
the principal questions are the manner and propriety of its exercise.
To begin with, unless corporate or shareholders' interest generally is
served, the action would seem at least improvident. Thus, at a mini-
mum we posit a situation where the shares are obtainable either pri-
vately or in the open market at a demonstrably advantageous price,
typically so far below a conservatively computed book value that retire-
ment would reflect a significant addition to the equity of the remaining
shareholders. Conceivably there might also be the rare case of a pur-
t B.A. 1925, Amherst College; LL.B. 1928, Columbia Law School. Partner, Berlack,
Israels & Liberman, New York City; Adjunct Professor of Law, Columbia Law School;
sometime Reporter on Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code; member of the en-
larged editorial board of the sponsors of the Code and Chairman of its subcommittee on
Article 8; consultant to the New York State Law Revision Commission.
1 12 App. Cas. 400 (1887).
2 Typical of the modern statutory approach are § 513 of the N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law and
§ 5 of the ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act (1960). These statutes cover both of the aspects
mentioned and also permit purchases for the purpose of eliminating fractional shares,
collecting or compromising indebtedness due the corporation or in satisfaction of the
appraisal rights of shareholders dissenting from a merger, consolidation or material amend-
ment to the certificate of incorporation. Older New York cases cast doubt upon the
enforceability of the corporation's contractual obligation to purchase its own shares for
possible lack of "mutuality" because there might be no available surplus when the obligation
matured. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 514 specifically overrules these cases, stating the rule in
precisely opposite terms: the obligation is specifically enforceable to the extent that "at
the time for performance" the purchase would be proper under § 513.
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chase so far below current market value as to assure corporate benefit
from resale, e.g., in satisfaction of outstanding warrants or options.
As between a private and an open market purchase, unless the seller
is a "controlling person," an officer, a director, or otherwise an "insider,"
the choice may properly be made on a price basis. Arguably, where a
large block is involved, a premium over market, reflecting what pre-
sumably would be the inflationary effect of a large "buy order," may
perhaps be justified.
Where the seller is an insider the questions are at once more com-
plicated. Does the transaction arguably represent an opportunity to
market an otherwise unmarketable block of shares, or one which at a
minimum would be difficult to market at the price? Is there an obligation
to make available pro rata to all shareholders whatever advantage may
be inherent in such a transaction? If that is done, is the vice cured?
There seems to be widespread opinion among corporate counsel that
there is such an obligation, as witness the number of cases in which
the insider sells only as one who has contracted to tender a specified
number of shares at a specified price under a procedure open pro rata
to all shareholders.
Where the general body of shareholders are the potential sellers,
questions may well arise as to the adequacy of the information made
available to them as the basis on which they will determine whether
or not to sell. At least where the procedure is direct tender to the cor-
poration, it seems quite clear that under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19341 and the SEC's Rule 10b-5 thereunder4 the
corporation as potential purchaser stands in a fiduciary relation to its
shareholders and must make adequate disclosure.5 Thus under some
circumstances the procedure might even require some sort of "reverse
prospectus."1
6
Where the purchases are made on the open market this aspect is less
3 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958).
4 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1942),. The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality -of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
There is no longer any doubt that breach of the rule gives rise to a civil cause of action
enforceable in the federal courts. T. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
5 Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962); Ward La France Truck
Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943).
6 Cf. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
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clear. At least there is no necessary contractual "privity" between buyer
and seller which, until comparatively recently, was thought prerequisite
to the establishment of liability under Rule 10b-5. 7
Suppose the shares of Corporation A are selling at eleven. The cor-
poration pursuant to a resolution of its board proceeds to make heavy
market purchases of its own shares. Indeed such purchases are the prin-
cipal factor in the market over a period of months, at the end of which
the shares are selling at twenty. The corporation then announces that
it will receive direct tenders of 100,000 shares at twenty-one and one-
half. Could a shareholder who had sold a thousand shares at twelve
(whether or not the corporation was in fact the purchaser) properly
complain that he should at least have been advised in advance of the
corporation's projected buying program, because had he been, he would
have held on at least until the floating supply was gathered in and the
price stabilized at a higher level?
Suppose then that X, a controlling person of the corporation, proposes
to tender 50,000 shares, some of which he acquired by market purchases
seven to nine months previously-perhaps just prior to the corporation's
entry into the market. Could it be urged that X had seized a corporate
opportunity and should account for his profit on the tendered shares?8
Suppose X knows of facts, as yet unreported to shareholders generally,
indicating that the corporation had suffered losses which when publicized
in the ordinary course are likely to cause a break in the market price
of the shares? Can the corporation rescind its purchase of the 50,000
shares that X had tendered? A recent case in the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, though decided on other grounds, suggests that
possibility.9
Purchases made deliberately for the sole or incidental purpose of
affecting control of the corporation raise another set of questions. In a
close corporation context the device may be particularly useful, enabling
a homogenous group of shareholder-managers to use corporate funds to
rid themselves of a discordant element, perhaps to break a deadlock and
7 Since Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), contractual
"privity" is probably no longer a necessary element of the cause of action.
5 Compare § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b) (1958), under which X would be liable for any "short-swing profit," with the
reluctance of courts to define "corporate opportunity" in terms of a purchase of shares.
Hauben v. Morris, 255 App. Div. 35, 5 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd mem., 281 N.Y.
652, 22 N.E.2d 482 (1939); Mannheirner v. Keehn, 30 Misc. 2d 584, 41 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sup.
Ct. Monroe County 1943), modified and aff'd, 268 App. Div. 813, 49 N.Y.S.2d 304 (4th Dep't
1944). But see Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co.,-31,Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (Ch. 1949); Lewin v.
New York Ambassador, Ind., 61 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1946), aff'd mem.,
271 App. Div. 927, 67 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1st Dep't 1947).
9 Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91,498 (7th Cir. 1965).
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thus effectively substitute for dissolution."0 In a public-issue corporation
the case would seem quite different. The reasoning of the decided cases
is to say the least parlous-and reveals no clear rationale. A Wisconsin
court more than fifty years ago faced the contention of a minority share-
holder that the corporate purchase of a portion of an insider's shares,
though authorized by the board and ratified by the shareholders, was,
by reducing the number of outstanding shares, primarily aimed at giving
defendant directors a majority and thus control. The court, rejecting
the contention, found the proof insufficient. There was, however, a vig-
orous dissent, and today the case probably stands for the proposition
that a purchase demonstrably made to maintain control is an abuse of
corporate power and thus a breach of fiduciary responsibility."
A Massachusetts court in 1950 held a corporate purchase designed to
give the directors control by reducing the total number of shares out-
standing to be a breach of the directors' fiduciary duty, 2 by analogy to
cases forbidding the resale of treasury shares to friendly purchasers in
order to ensure continuing control in the management group.'3
Four Delaware decisions present the other side of the coin.' 4 All four
opinions pay lip service to the principle that a purchase made "solely"
or even "primarily" for the purpose of maintaining control is a breach of
the directors' fiduciary duty. However in three of the four cases the
courts have sustained the directors' defenses on the theory that a threat
to control by an "outsider" poses a question of "corporate policy" in
terms of conflicting views as between management and a large "outside"
interest as to how the business should be conducted in the future. Nor-
mally one would expect such questions to be determined by the share-
holders at the polls. On that theory the courts have permitted manage-
ment to defend its "policies" in proxy contests at corporate expense' 5 and
have sanctioned corporate reimbursement of the expenses of successful
insurgent shareholders."6
10 Cf. Israels, "The [Law Revision] Commission and the Corporation Laws," 40 Cornell
L.Q. 686, 692 (1955); Israels, "The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of
Deadlock and Dissolution," 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 778 (1952).
11 Gilchrist v. Highfield, 140 Wis. 476, 123 N.W. 102 (1909).
12 Andersen v. Albert & J. M. Anderson Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 343, 90 N.E.2d 541 (1950).
'3 Elliott v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 80 N.E. 450 (1907); cf. Maclit v. Merchants Mortgage
& Credit Co., 22 Del. Ch. 74, 194 AtI. 19 (Ch. 1937); see Bowen v. Imperial Theatres, Inc.,
13 Del. Ch. 120, 129, 115 At. 918, 922 (Ch. 1922).
14 Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964); Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405 (Del.
1962); Martin v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d'295 (Sup. Ct.
1952); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (Ch. 1960).
15 Hall v. Trans-lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 AtI. 226
(Ch. 1934); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d
291 (1955).
16 Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine
& Airplane Corp., supra note 15.
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Citing this analogy the Chancellor in Kors v. Carey1" upheld man-
agement's "defense" of its "policies" at corporate expense by purchase
of the opposition's shareholdings at a premium price.
The latest Delaware decision, Cheff v. Matkes, 8 treats the premium
purchase of "opposition" shareholdings as one of ordinary "business
judgment" as to which the directors could do what they pleased so long
as they acted in good faith and after investigation sufficient to convince
them that there was "a reasonable threat to the continued existence of
[the corporation] or at least existence in its present form." 9 In the Bennet
case, which went the other way, the Supreme Court found there was "no
immediate indication" that the outside interest would start to buy large
numbers of shares in the market; therefore management's action in mak-
ing large purchases for the corporation had been "illegal."20 Clearly in
the court's view the sin was not the purchase. It was having acted pre-
cipitately-without evidence of clear and present danger. Kors and Ctefj
stand clearly for the proposition that directors of a Delaware corpora-
tion, once convinced that control is threatened by an outside interest
which arguably would advocate some change classifiable with any veri-
similitude as "policy," can decide a priori that such change would not
be in the best interests of all the shareholders. Having so decided, they
may with impunity proceed to make substantial expenditures of corpo-
rate funds to acquire at premium prices sufficient shares to assure that
the general body of shareholders will be deprived of all opportunity
effectively to exercise their franchise.2
Only one reported New York case seems to have involved a similar
issue. In Lawrence v. Decca Records, Inc.,22 one of several charges put
forward in a derivative action for waste and mismanagement was the use
of corporate funds to purchase its own shares (and thereby bolster man-
agement's control) at a time when the corporation needed the money
for other purposes. The court held the allegation "for pleading purposes
sufficient to survive the application of the business judgment rule."
O'Neill v. Maytage3 raises the interesting question of the availability
17 39 Del. Ch. 47, 51, 158 A.2d 136, 140-41 (Ch. 1960).
18 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
19 Id. at 555-56.
20 Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962). Only the chairman who made the
purchases without board approval was held liable. Recognizing that the general rule is
that "directors who use corporate funds to preserve control commit a wrong," the
court neverthdless absolved the remaining members of the board who had merely voted to
ratify the chairman's acts on the basis of "prior ignorance and immediate emergency."
Id. at 411.
21 Cf. Berle, "Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust," 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1931);
Israels, "Are Corporate Powers Still Held in Trust?" 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1446 (1964).
22 27 Misc. 2d 445, 203 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Spec. T. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960).
23 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
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of a remedy under Rule 10b (5) in this context. National Airlines and
Pan American World Airways were ordered by the Civil Aeronautics
Board to terminate the existing "cross ownership" of each other's shares.
They chose to accomplish this by an exchange rather than by sale in the
market. National thus acquired 390,000 of its own shares (twenty-one
per cent of the total outstanding) on a basis which at current New York
Stock Exchange prices reflected the payment of a premium of approxi-
mately $1,800,000 to Pan American. The transaction was attacked under
the rule as designed to get a large block of National shares off the market
and thus solidify management's control. Apparently, the theory was that
the transaction was either a "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,"
or an "act, practice, or course of business which operates or would oper-
ate as a fraud or deceit upon" the corporation. 4 In Ruckle v. Roto Am.
Corp.,26 decided only a few weeks before O'Neill, the court of appeals
had found that the majority of the directors of a corporation, who
through concealment of material facts at a directors' meeting had caused
the corporation to sell treasury shares to enable the president to perpet-
uate his controlling position, were accountable under the rule; in effect
that the claim that a corporation was induced by its controlling directors
to sell shares for an inadequate consideration as part of a scheme to
maintain control, stated a cause of action under the rule. Nevertheless
in O'Neill a majority of the court (Judges Lumbard and Marshall)
thought the rule inapplicable; in effect that a claim that a corporation
was induced by controlling directors to buy shares for excessive con-
sideration as part of a scheme to maintain control, failed to state a cause
of action of the type contemplated by the rule, absent some "claim of
deceit, withheld information or misstatement of material fact.1
26
The rule in two of its three subdivisions speaks in terms of a "device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud"; and of an "act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit."2 7 On the
other hand the statute under which the rule was promulgated speaks only
in terms of a "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance,"', and
thus arguably justifies the court's narrower construction of the rule.
However, even adopting the court's premise that to sustain a cause of
action under the rule, some form of "deceit" of the corporation had to
be shown, the soundness of the decision is open to argument, at least in
24 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1942).
25 Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
26 O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 767 (2d Cir. 1964).
27 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b(5)(a), (c).
28 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958).
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terms of its consistency with the Ruckle case.29 It is true, of course, that
in Ruckle there were two directors who did not know the facts, whereas
in O'Neill presumably all of the directors knew the facts. The facts in
each case were the purpose or motivation for a transaction in securities.
Since motivation is personal to management and thus potentially in con-
flict with fiduciary duty to the corporation, its concealment may properly
be classified as a "deceit."
Nor is the key found by counting the noses of the directorate to see
which may be clean. If it is possible to "deceive" the corporation by con-
cealment of the purpose of a transaction in securities from a minority of
the board of directors, it is equally possible to "deceive" it even where
every member of the board knows all of the facts. To begin with there
is the established principle of the law of agency that since a corporation
acquires knowledge only through communication from individuals, knowl-
edge acquired by individuals which it is in their personal interest to con-
ceal, is not imputable to the corporation.f0 Then there are the limitations
cases, arising under statutes which begin to run from the date on which
"the aggrieved party" acquires knowledge or should reasonably have ac-
quired knowledge of the facts. In general these cases refuse to impute to
corporations knowledge held by wrongdoing directors, and in some cases
refuse to impute it even though new directors come on the board so long
as a majority of wrongdoers remains in control."1 Apposite also would
be the famous opinion of Chief justice Rugg of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co.
v. Bigelow-. The case was one seeking recovery of promoters' "secret
profits" obtained in a transaction approved by unanimous action of the
board at a time when the defendant promoters not only constituted the
entire membership of the board of directors, but were the beneficial own-
ers of all of the then outstanding shares. Nevertheless an action insti-
tuted in behalf of the corporation to benefit its public stockholders, who
necessarily became such considerably after the transaction, was sus-
tained. The gravamen was clearly "that type of . . fraudulent practice
usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities,"ss and the
29 Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., supra note 25. Judge Hays dissented in O'Neill v. Maytag,
supra note 26, at 770, but did not spell out his reasoning.
80 See, e.g., American Nat'l Bank v. Miller, 229 U.S. 517 (1913); Anderson v. General
Am. Life Ins. Co., 141 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1944); In re L. Van Bokkelen, Inc., 7 F. Supp.
639 (D. Md. 1934).
31 There are illustrative New York and federal cases among those collated in a footnote
by Circuit judge Clark in Michelsen v. Penney, 135 F.2d 409, 416 n.2 (2d Cir. 1943).
32 203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193 (1909)1.
33 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952), quoted by Judge Lumbard in ONeill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir.
1964).
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court's emphasis throughout the opinion is on the concealment aspect. It
seems to the writer plainly arguable that in O'Neill there was at least as
much "concealment of material facts" from National Airlines as there
was from the Old Dominion Copper Company in Bigelow.
Clearly there is an increasing volume of civil litigation under the fed-
eral Securities Acts, involving in the main implied rights of action under
Rule 10b-S and other "antifraud provisions."34 Where the corporation
is a defrauded purchaser of its own securities, resort to an implied cause
of action may not be necessary. Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933"5 provides a direct remedy against the seller of securities, whether
or not registered, who makes the sale by means of a "prospectus or oral
communication" which contains a misleading statement, either as mis-
representation or as half-truth. One may venture the prediction that
there will be further litigation involving corporate purchases of their
own shares, not only under the federal acts but in state courts as well,
and that at least in jurisdictions less management-oriented than Dela-
ware, the current federal tendency toward strict enforcement of man-
agerial fiduciary obligation 36 will be reflected in some state decisions.
34 See Posner, "Developments in Federal Securities Regulations," 20 Bus. Law. 595, 604
(1965).
35 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1958).
36 Cf. Friendly, "In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law," 19 Record
of N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n 64, 85-86 (1964).
